Measuring Vulnerability and Exposure to Illicit Financial Flows in Africa

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Financial secrecy enables all types of IFFs. tax justice

- Financial Secrecy enables Illicit Financial Flows (High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows out of Africa 2015, "Mbeki Panel")
- IFFs are hidden: likelihood of an illicit component increases in the degree of financial opacity in any given transaction
- Since 2015, whistleblowers and leaks illustrated range of IFFs concerned
 - illegal origin capital ("classic money laundering", i.e. illegal drug-, weapon-, and human trafficking; embezzlement/corruption); and
 - legal origin capital (market rigging, tax avoidance, evasion)

...& IFFs everywhere on the planet (incl. Africa)




Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry (April, 2016)

https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/the-power-players/; 10.9.2018.



Revealing secrets of the world elite's hidden wealth (November, 2017)



Companies and individuals from 52 African countries were in the data.

Elites of 7 African countries were named in the papers.

Corporate quest for secrecy?







Pursuing "the Holy Grail of tax avoidance"

	APPLE - PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS QUESTIONNAIRE	€ 2014
1,2	Confirm that an Irish company can conduct management activities (such as board meetings, signing of important contracts) without being subject to taxation in your jurisdiction.	
1,4	What information is publicly visible (e.g., through the companies registry or equivalent) when a company is registered in your jurisdiction.	
1,7	Is there a credible opposition party or movement that may replace the current government?	

https://projekte.sueddeutsche.de/paradisepapers/wirtschaft/apple-scouts-a-country-without-rules-e654132/; red highlights by mm;

Source:

IFF risk measures: motivating questions



Considering the entirety of a jurisdiction's external economic relationships, where is the highest risk for IFFs, and which (partner) jurisdictions are relevant for addressing this problem?

What data sources exist to answer the questions above?

What policy recommendations can be drawn from the findings?

IFF risk measures: concept



Intuition:

IFF risk = Financial Secrecy Level of partner jurisdiction * **Size/Volume** of cross-border stock/flow/transaction

Financial Secrecy Level

Secrecy Scores of the Financial Secrecy Index (112 juris)

Size/Volume

- Macro: 8 broad IFF channels in 4 bilateral external economic datasets:
 - Trade: Imports and Exports (UN COMTRADE)
 - Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and Outward (IMF's CDIS)
 - Banking: Liabilities and Claims (BIS)
 - Portfolio Investment: Liabilities and Assets (IMF's CPIS)
- Micro: transaction level data (customs, central banks [ForEx], tax return data, company registry data [ownership, financial statements], suspicious transactions reports, etc.]

FSI 2018: Secrecy Scores



Own	ership Registration	Legal Entity Transparency			egrity of tax and ancial regulation	International Standards and Cooperation		
1	Banking secrecy	6	Public Company Ownership		Tax Administration Capacity	17	Anti-Money Laundering	
	IDs 89, 157, 158, 352, 353 and 360		IDs 470 – 475, 485 and 486		IDs 317 and 400 to 406		ID 335	
2	Trusts and Foundations Register	7	Public Company Accounts	12	Consistent Personal Income Tax	18	Automatic Information Exchange	
	IDs 204, 206, 214, 234, 236 - 240, 244, 355, 384, 393, 395 and 396		IDs 188, 189 and 201		IDs 374, 435 and 489		IDs 150, 371 - 374, 376 and 377	
3	Recorded Company Ownership			13	Avoids Promoting Tax Evasion	19	Bilateral Treaties	
	IDs 388, 470 - 473, 485 and 486		ID 318		Cf. Tax Details section of the country database reports		IDs 301 and 143	
4	Other Wealth ownership	9	Corporate Tax Disclosure	14	Tax Court Secrecy	20	International Legal Cooperation	
	IDs 416, 418, 437, 439 and 487		IDs 363, 419 and 421		IDs 407 to 410		IDs 33, 35, 36, 309 - 314 and 469	
5	Limited Partnership Transparency	10	Legal Entity Identifier	15	Harmful Structures			
	IDs 269, 272, 273, 274, 476, 477 and 479 to 484		IDs 414, 415 and 420		IDs 172, 184, 224 and 488			
				16	Public Statistics			

IDs 425 to 434

- Arithmetic average of 20 Key Financial Secrecy Indicators (0-1), 4 areas, driven by 115 variables ("IDs"), 0-100
- Fully referenced to source, verifiable
- More demanding than IOs/standards
- Open Data: all data downloadable
- Used by financial intelligence units, public prosecutors, risk rating agencies, tax administrations, central banks, etc.
 - https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/

Source: TJN 2018 (FSI-Methodology), page 12 Weakest Link Principle

Potential economic channels for IFFs – example COMTRADE, CDIS



Flow	Manipulation	Illicit motivation
Exports	Over-pricing	Exploit subsidy regime
		(Re)patriate undeclared capital
	Under-pricing	Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit
		Shift criminal proceeds out
		Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation)
Imports	Under-pricing	Evade tariffs
		(Re)patriate undeclared capital
	Over-pricing	Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit
		Shift criminal proceeds out
		Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation)
		Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit
Inward investment	Under-pricing	Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit
		Shift criminal proceeds out
		Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation)
	Over-pricing	(Re)patriate undeclared capital
	Anonymity	Hide market dominance
	Anonymity	Hide political involvement
Outward investment	Under-pricing	Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation)
	Over-pricing	Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit
		Shift criminal proceeds out
	Anonymity	Hide political involvement

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa/African Union 2015 (Mbeki Panel Report)

Vulnerability, Intensity, Exposure



- $i ∈ {1,...,I}$ reporting country
- $^{\bullet}$ *t* ∈{2008,...,2018} year
- X_{ijt} flow or stock value of crossborder transaction between reporter i and partner j at time t
- $extbf{Y}_{it}$ GDP of reporting country i at time t
- SS_j Secrecy Score (or individual KFSI) of partner country j


Vulnerability	$V_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}}$
Intensity	$I_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}}{Y_{it}}$
Exposure	$E_{it} = V_{it} \cdot I_{it}$ $= \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}} \cdot \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}}{Y_{it}}$ $= \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{Y_{it}}$

Data availability: a key challenge



Data availability is a key challenge for Africa...







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...and over time...








9DE0C3367363&sld=1481580274211; 9.9.2018 Source: http://data.imf.org/?sk=B981B4E3-4E58-467E-9B90-

...and for specific channels.





- In Africa, bilateral data coverage is best for trade
- Second best for foreign direct investment CDIS (see left); inward better than outward
- Third best for portfolio investment CPIS (previous slide: max 4 reporters, EGY, LBR, MUS, ZAF); assets better than liabilities
- Worst for banking BIS data (only one reporter, ZAF)

Strategies to overcome data coverage challenges



- Panel data: using multiple years
- Live Data: refresh analyses with instant data updates
- Mirror Data: derive PF liabilities/outward FDI from PF assets/inward
 FDI reported by all jurisdictions
- Transparency: make explicit where data coverage is constraining analyses
- [→ Policy Ask: improve statistical coverage and capacity]

Final Dataset – Coverage Africa



 2008-2018, instant downloading and scraping from original data providers (COMTRADE, IMF, BIS)

IFF Channel / Dataset	<u>-</u>	Coverage (%, out of 60)
Export	42	70.0%
Import	42	70.0%
FDI Inward	21	35.0%
FDI Outward (derived)	60	100.0%
Banking Claims	1	1.7%
Banking Liabilities	1	1.7%
Portfolio Assets	3	5.0%
Portfolio Liabilities (derived)	59	98.3%
*if secrecy scores of partner j	urisdiction is also available.	

Country Level analyses: examples of South Africa and Burkina Faso



Vulnerability - FDI - Inward - 2016



	Burkina Faso	South Africa					
Jurisdiction	Iurisdiction SS Inward FDI Stock (USD) VulShare		Jurisdiction	SS	Inward FDI Stock (USD)	VulShare	
Barbados	74	573543196	37%	United Kingdom	42	51899345608	31%
Canada	55	600468700	29%	Netherlands	66	28920782348	27%
Bermuda	73	233996775	15%	USA	60	9250718882	8%
France	52	177313974	8%	Germany	59	6745247343	6%
Isle of Man	64	68723469	4%	China	60	5677904483	5%
United Kingdom	42	-70997485	3%	Japan	61	5195459079	4%
India	52	40579082	2%	Luxembourg	58	3949227042	3%
Mauritius	72	11330068	1%	Australia	51	4178099960	3%
Ghana	62	10522086	1%	Switzerland	76	1541238413	2%
Luxembourg	58	8876875	0%	Malaysia	72	1330415179	1%
Overall				Overall			
Vulnerability				Vulnerability			
Inward FDI	63			Inward FDI	54		

Vulnerability - FDI - Outward (derived) - tax justice 2016



	Burkina Faso	South Africa					
Jurisdiction	SS	Outward FDI Stock (USD)	VulShare	Jurisdiction	SS	Outward FDI Stock (USD)	VulShare
Singapore	67	6983337	60%	Mauritius	72	15754600000	37%
China	60	1221943	9%	Hong Kong	71	14743874129	34%
Mauritius	72	1000000	9%	Austria	56	3856108620	7%
USA	60	-1000000	8%	USA	60	3114000000	6%
Luxembourg	58	-682021	5%	Australia	51	2555755200	4%
Italy	49	660056	4%	United Kingdom	42	2029830000	3%
Belgium	44	-632460	4%	Botswana	69	950797612	2%
Poland	57	-119637	1%	Luxembourg	58	659231829	1%
Cyprus	61	-12017	0%	Singapore	67	478600567	1%
				Germany	59	523019528	1%
Overall				Overall			
Vulnerability				Vulnerability			
Outward FDI	64			Outward FDI	66		

Vulnerability – Banking Liabilities – 2016





South Africa				AEOI	Ghana (derived foreign assets)			
Jurisdiction	SS	Banking Liab (USD)	VulShare	Activated AEOI relationship (sending)?	Jurisdiction	SS	Banking Liab (USD)	VulShar e
United Kingdom	42	13196000000	30%	Υ	South Africa	56	540000000	-
Isle of Man	64	4429000000	15%	Υ	Isle of Man	64	68883000	-
United States of America	60	2459000000	8%	N	United Kingdom	42	1956000000	-
China	60	2332000000	8%	Υ	Jersey	65	39000000	-
United Arab Emirates	84	1129000000	5%	N	Belgium	44	86043000	-
Mauritius	72	1230000000	5%	Υ	Germany	59	163000000	-
Germany	59	1097000000	4%	Υ	United States of America	60	531000000	-
France	52	1165000000	3%	Υ	Switzerland	76	114492000	-
Taiwan	76	493000000	2%	N	Hong Kong	71	155533000	-
Ghana	62	54000000	2%	N	Austria	56	15235000	-
Overall Vulnerability Banking Liabilities	56			http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic- exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/exchange- relationships/; 12.11.2018	Overall Vulnerability Banking Liabilities	Ş		

→ AEOI: what share of this is covered under existing AEOI? Loopholes in CRS necessitates statistics disclosure

Summary Vulnerability over 8 channels, averages 2008-2018









Summary Intensity over 8 channels, averages 2008-2018









Summary Exposure over 8 channels, averages 2008-2018









Vulnerability, intensity and exposure in trade in Africa, averages 2008-2018








Vulnerability in trade in Africa, averages 2008-18





Intensity of trade in Africa, averages 2008-18






Exposure of trade in Africa, averages 2008-18

Panel aggregate measures of vulnerability, intensity and exposure




IFF Vulnerability in Africa 2008-2018






Intensity in Africa 2008-2018





IFF Exposure in Africa 2008-2018





Preliminary conclusions and policy recommendations



Preliminary conclusions



At Present

- Macro data driven analyses enable strategic and tactic orientation across a number of government administration departments (tax admin, central banks, financial intelligence units, customs/police, etc.)
 - capacity building priorities (human and other resources)
 - policy priorities (incl. treaty negotiation, anti-avoidance measures, economic statistics)
 - audit priorities
- E.g. through checkup of current priorities/focus through country risk profiles (e.g. Burkina Faso, South Africa)

In Future

- Complement secrecy driven analyses with specific corporate tax haven indicators (from Q1 2019)
- Partnering with tax administrations in Africa for advancing micro-/transaction level risk analyses – e.g. with customs transaction level data, corporate registry data, tax returns, suspicious transaction reports, etc.

Preliminary policy recommendations



- Enhance (macro) statistical capacity & data availability by considering participating in CDIS, CPIS, BIS (or national equivalent reporting)
- Analyse country risk profiles (in report to be published Q1 2019) and consider adequate capacity and/or policy and/or audit response
- When engaging in automatic exchange of information, legislate for public statistics on AEOI (e.g. Australia, template in Knobel/Meinzer 2017)
- Research takeaways:
 - dataset will be made available Q1 2019 goldmine of data (regressions, etc.)
 - please reach out as we are interested to build long term research collaborations with universities (e.g. on FSI, CTHI, IFF risk)

Literature



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Thank you!

For further information please visit:

www.taxjustice.net

www.coffers.eu

www.financialsecrecyindex.com





