#### Future of Taxing Multinational Corporations

#### Transfer pricing issues in Central America Ricardo Barrientos

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## **Central American elites evolution**

- Growing non-CA corporations presence in the region
- But also, recent local elites evolution:
  - From local or national oligarchic monopolies...
  - ... to regional transnational corporations and groups
  - ... and even in some cases, to global scale multinational corporations
- In both cases, transfer pricing control has become an urgent need to tackle new regional capital flows
  - Not a "far away developed-country fashionablecomplicated-expensive" practice



#### Awkward income tax design

- For example: Guatemalan income tax
- Coexistence of two optional regimes:
  - Real income tax: 31% on net profits
  - Simplified: 5% on gross income
- Current equilibrium point between two regimes: profits equivalent to 16% of income
- Then, many Guatemalan corporations break down in 2 sub-companies (related partners), one in each regime

#### Awkward income tax design

- By manipulating transfer prices they achieve to allocate:
  - Profits over 16% in the simplified 5% regime on gross income
  - Profits below 16% in the 31% real income tax regime
- So, transfer pricing tax control is needed not only for transnational corporations
  - Local and particular circumstances may require tax control on transfer pricing



## **Recent TP legislation in CA**

- 2008: regional council of MOF (COSEFIN) prepared a model of TP legislation
  - OECD based model
  - Technically assisted by IMF and IADB
- All 5 CA countries have made TP legislation drafts
- But only 3 have approved them: GUA, ESV and HND
  - Weakened versions of original proposals
  - In GUA, only for multinational corporations
- Legislative approval surrounded by stiff private sector resistance and distrust: complexity and burden of proof



#### But... far from effective

- CA TA's are building technical expertise and administrative framework
  - But, the main issue is political will
  - Elite power and State capture is a big issue
  - Then, more a political challenge than a technical one...
- Nevertheless, there are big technical challenges
  - Legislation is based on OECD model: complex and where to find viable comparables and concurrent prices?
  - Alternative methodologies are desirable: do they work?



#### Alternative methods for CA

- Simon Pak's price filter matrix method
  - ICEFI found that its application in Guatemala is possible
  - Recommend to test its practical effectiveness
- Brazilian method
  - Relies on company's own data
  - Applies to a more expanded group than
    OECD: unrelated foreign entities (interesting for Guatemala!)



#### Some conclusions

- Need to apply TP control in CA:
  - Because of growing MC presence
  - But also because of trans-nationalization of regional elites
- Some OECD model based legislation approved... but far from effective
- Main challenge: politics. Captured states and regional elites and groups excessive power



#### Some conclusions

- But also technical challenge: legislation is too complex. TA's working to improve
- Alternative models are required in CA: Brazil's or Pak
  - Viable but must be tested in practice (ICEFI's interest)
  - Adaptable to particularities: Guatemalan case



# Thank you!

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