Economic Crisis + Offshore
Many of the roots of the current global economic crisis trace back to offshore financial centres located in tax havens. These include both those located in the smaller, mostly island states like Cayman and Jersey, and the larger tax havens like the City of London, Switzerland, Dublin, Delaware or Luxembourg.
These tax havens did not "cause" the crisis, but they contributed powerfully to it. This happened in a number of interlinked ways:
- They offered what has been called a "get out of regulation free" card to businesses that abuse them.
- The offshore system enabled U.S. financial services companies in particular (but also others) to get around domestic regulations and grow fast, achieving political and regulatory "capture" and contributing to the "too big to fail" banking problem. This happened first in the offshore Euromarkets from the 1960s, and then in the wider global offshore system.
- Unhealthy competition on tax and regulation between tax havens, and
between them and other jurisdictions, eviscerated and degraded
regulations that may otherwise have staunched the crisis.
- Tax incentives, typically through tax havens, played a major role in
accelerating the build-up in debt and leverage across the global
financial system.
- “Satellite” tax havens like some Caribbean islands or Britain’s Crown Dependencies are conduits for illicit and other financial flows, often from developing countries into financial centres like London, New York, and these contributed to large macroeconomic imbalances. The mainstream economics profession has not measured these vast flows, many of which (such as transfer mispricing) simply do not show up in national statistics.
- A key feature of the crisis is that the financial system became frozen as a result of mutual mistrust and impenetrable complexity making it impossible for actors to understand the financial positions of their partners. The secrecy jurisdictions, by giving companies incentives to festoon their financial affairs across multiple jurisdictions, and by covering these affairs in a veil of secrecy, played a major part.
- Tax havens provided the cover for all manner of fraudulent business models - such as those offered by Bernie Madoff, Allen Stanford and others.
- Offshore centres helped corporations conceal serious losses, which contributed to the build-up.
- Offshore bank booking centres have played a powerful role in creating liquidity, which underlay the crisis.
- Tax havens, by giving banks with global reach a "competitive" advantage over their more nationally-based rivals (by permitting evasion and avoidance of tax and regulatory obligations, contributed powerfully to the "too big to fail" problem.
Not only that, but by draining reputable jurisdictions of the tax dollars of their wealthiest citizens and corporations, and by fostering massive capital flight out of developing countries, they have made it so much harder for victims of the crisis to pay to clean up the mess.
Other material
The broad analysis above is bolstered by various other documents, and a number of other players have subsequently supported or repeated TJN's analysis. See, for example:
- July 2010 - IMF: Rehypothecation and offshore London
- June 2010 - the role of the offshore Euromarkets in helping U.S. banks in particular achieve "political capture" and enjoy the "too big to fail" implicit subsidy.
- June 2010 - Lucy Komisar in The American Interest, on how the Cayman Islands is being used to forestall tighter regulation.
- June 2010 - more on hedge funds' role.
- May 2010 - Review of IMF's concerns about offshore and excess leverage, pp12-13 of Tax Justice Focus.
- April 2010 - Goldman deal went through Cayman , pattern is offshore.
- March 2010 - IMF expresses alarm about offshore role in crisis
- Feb 2010 - On an IMF report on small financial centres
- Sept 2009 series of blogs on tax havens and the crisis, including on living wills, the Too Big To Fail problem, the links between tax arbitrage and systemic risk, on evading bankers' pay curbs, and on the widespread links between offshore tax devices and regulatory evasion.
- June 2009 IMF report on tax roots of the global economic crisis
- May 2009 FT article "How tax havens helped to create a crisis" by TJN senior adviser Sol Picciotto.
- March 2009 at the G20 summit: UK Government official appears to recognise the links.
- Joseph Stiglitz' UN Commission of experts on reforming the international monetary and financial system makes several points about the links between tax havens and the financial crisis, many of which TJN has proposed before. See here, and follow the link to the original report.
- Nicola Liebert of TJN-Germany and Axel Troost of the German Bundestag examine the links between tax haven and the economic crisis here, March 2009.
- March 2009: TJN's Action Program Ending the Offshore Secrecy System.
- GFIP report on the economic crisis and offshore, Feb 2009
- William Brittain-Catlin examines the links between offshore and the financial crisis.
- Christian Aid report on The impact of the financial crisis on the developing world
- Jim Stewart's investigation into the role of tax havens and tax and regulatory competition in Dublin's International Financial Services Centre here (and the editorial in the same document gives additional analysis.)
- TJN's submission to the UK Treasury Committee on offshore financial centres, here, followed by a series of blogs: Part 1 - Part II - Part III (what to do) - Part IV (nation states and global governance.) This has been followed by a blog looking at fragmented financial architecture, and a look at the role of accounting in all this.
- Several political leaders supporting TJN's analysis, here (a top US senator, Carl Levin); here (French Prime Minister); here (French president)
- Other commentators, such as here (UK focus, by Willem Buiter); here (Sunday Herald analysis); here (TV debate on tax havens and tax competition); here (the FT); here the IMF and the OECD recognising the problem); here (a former top banker); here (a legendary US crime-fighter).
- Prof Sol Picciotto looks at a case study involving Bermuda and a credit derivatives swaps company here.
- In addition, note the role that illicit flows have played in macroeconomic imbalances that built up ahead of the market disruptions. Click here, and watch this space for more.
- Richard Murphy gives an example of how offshore incentives interact with executive remuneration (May 2008).
- TJN's article that appeared in the UK's Guardian newspaper, written by John Christensen and Richard Murphy.
- June 2008 - Creating Turmoil - TJN's submission to the UK Treasury Select Committee
